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Lonker: GeneralNOTES
Dynamics v. Superior Court: One Giant Step Forward for In

NOTE, GENERAL DYNAMICS V. SUPERIOR COURT: ONE

GIANT STEP FORWARD FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL OR ONE
SMALL STP BACK TO THE STATUS Quo?
INTRODUCTION

A high ranking corporate officer responsible for environmental planning
and control is asked by the corporation's president to shred documents

evidencing an illegal release of highly toxic chemicals into the groundwater.
He is aware that the corporation intends to hide the release.

The corporate

officer refuses to engage in such unlawful behavior and decides to report the
conduct in the interest of public safety. The corporation promptly dismisses

the officer for refusing to comply with the corporation's instructions. Under
current law, the corporate officer can sue his employer for wrongful
termination and obtain compensation while he searches for another job.!
However, in jurisdictions other than California, a corporate in-house
counsel placed in the same situation would have no recourse whatsoever.'
He or she could be terminated without recourse for refusing to perform an
act that would ultimately endanger the public welfare.' Until recently, this
question had not been addressed in California. In General Dynamics v.
Superior Court,4 however, the California Supreme Court fashioned a limited
right for in-house counsel to sue their employers for wrongful termination.
1. See, e.g., Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)
(employee allowed to bring wrongful termination suit after being fired for refusing to commit
perjury); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (l. 1981) (public policy claim
allowed for employee who investigated and reported criminal activity of his employer);
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (employee cannot be fired
for exercising a statutorily conferred right to file a Workers Compensation suit); O'Sullivan v.
Mallon, 390 A.2d 149 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (employee may bring wrongful
termination suit for refusing to perform a medical procedure for which she was not licensed to
perform).
2. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'don othergrounds,
855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991) (refusing to allow
in-house counsel the right to sue after being terminated for objecting to the sale of defective
medical equipment); Herbster v. North American Co. for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343,
346-348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (refusing to allow in house counsel the right to sue after being
terminated for refusing to destroy certain discovery documents). See also Michael L. Closen &
Mark E. Wojcik, Lawyers Out in the Cold, 73 A.B.A. J. 94 (1987). But see Mourad v.
Automobile Club Ins. Assoc., 465 N.W. 2d 395, 399, 402 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) and Nordling
v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 503 (Minn. 1991) (holding that in-house
counsel have the right to sue for wrongful termination based on contract principles, but not
public policy). Compare with Parker v. M & T Chem., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 222 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that in-house counsel have the right to sue for wrongful
termination based on a specific whistleblower statute, but failing to address whether a
professional standard of ethics could serve as sufficient public policy).
3. For a comprehensive survey of recent case law regarding this subject, see Damian E.
Okasinski, Annotation, In-House Counsel's Right to MaintainAction for Wrongful Discharge,
16 A.L.R. 5th 239 (1993).
4. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
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Why it took so long for the California courts to recognize that just as
non-attorney employees need protection from wrongful termination, so do
attorneys who are similarly situated, is unclear. In essence, the previous
standard enunciated by the courts was that because one chose to be a lawyer
and therefore was required to follow certain mandated professional standards,
she did not have the right to be treated fairly in their employment. 5 On its
face, this proposition raises some clear inequities.
In-house counsel share one overriding common characteristic with their
non-attorney corporate counterparts: they are dependent on one company for
their livelihood. Therefore, they should be entitled to substantially the same
rights afforded their colleagues. Unfortunately, rigid rules applicable to
attorneys, shaped and molded from centuries-old predicates of common law,
dictate otherwise. These rules conflict with the evolving role of attorneys in
society and with the evolving economic structure of society. Earlier case law
has struggled with this concept. Prior to GeneralDynamics, courts recognized the inherent unfairness that follows from the attorney-client relationship
as applied in the corporate setting. These courts, however, have not been
bold enough to confront these issues. The GeneralDynamics court finally
made such an attempt and did resolve some of the problems inherent in the
in-house counsel employment setting.
This Note will analyze this recent decision of the California Supreme
Court and will examine its impact on in-house counsel in California. Part
I will briefly discuss the tort of wrongful discharge and the public policy
exception. Part II will discuss wrongful termination as it relates to attorneys.
Part III will analyze the court's opinion in the GeneralDynamics case. Part
IV will examine the impact and effect of General Dynamics on in-house
counsel in California. Part V will further discuss whether the case was
correctly decided and, if not, what further steps need to be taken, specifically
concentrating on the confidentiality rules in California. Part VI will propose
an alternate dispute resolution system as a possible solution to the confidentiality problem associated with attorney suits against their clients. 6 This Note

5. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6. This Note will focus exclusively on wrongful termination based on public policy. It will
not address wrongful terminations based on contract theories. The General Dynamics Court
noted that, "because so-called 'just cause' contractual claims are unlikely to implicate values
central to the attorney-client relationship, there is no valid reason why an in-house attorney
should not be permitted to pursue such a contract claim in the same way as the non-attorney
employee." General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d at 490. A "just cause" claim is
a limitation on an employer's historical power to terminate an employee at-will, which differs
from a public policy claim. It arises out of the conduct of the parties in the employment
relationship and not from some type of public good. Id. at 495, 497. For example, a "course
of conduct" could include certain oral representations that a person will not be fired except for
good cause, glowing recommendations from superiors and promotions. Foley v. Interactive
Data, 765 P.2d 373, 384 (Cal. 1988). A court can determine that, based upon a certain "course
of conduct," an implied-in-fact contract not to fire except for good cause has been established.
If an implied-in-fact contract not to fire except for good cause arises then the employer cannot
fire the employee at will.
Indeed, some jurisdictions that do not allow in-house counsel to sue on public policy
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will conclude that while the California Supreme Court did indeed take a bold

step in recognizing that in-house counsel require some protection against
wrongful termination, because of the current state of the law in California,

it will be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish the laudable goals set
forth in the GeneralDynamics decision.
I. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

A. The History of Employment-at-Will

The tort of retaliatory discharge arose as a means to counter the harsh
results that followed from the employment-at-will doctrine.7 The employment-at-will doctrine is a court-developed doctrine drawn from a nineteenth
century treatise on master-servant law.'

The doctrine was that an at-will

employee was terminable by the employer for any reason.9 Courts generally
felt that rules precluding an employer's right to terminate their employees
would force those employers to associate with their employees in a nonconsensual relationship.10
Because of changing social structures and mores, certain public policy
concerns began to compete with the at-will doctrine, causing conflict and

rendering it increasingly outmoded."

Out of this conflict between the

grounds, specifically allow contract claims. See Rand v. CF Industries, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 643
(N.D. Ill. 1992) (applying Illinois law); see also Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Assoc., 465
N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), Nordling v. Northern State Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498
(Minn. 1991). But see Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ill. 1991), and Herbster v. North
American Co. for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
7. Elliot M. Abramson, Why Not RetaliatoryDischargefor Attorneys: A Polemic, 58 TENN.
L. REV. 271, 272 (1991).
8. Id. at 271 (quoting H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT 134 (2d ed. 1886)).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 271-72. Professor Abramson also explains that the employment-at-will doctrine
was further tempered by the common law principle that parties may not incorporate terms into
a contract that are clearly injurious to the public welfare (citing People ex rel. Peabody v.
Chicago Gas Trust Co., 22 N.E. 798, 803 (I1. 1889)). See generally Raymis H.C. Kim,
Comment, In-House Counsel's Wrongful Discharge Under the Public Policy Exception and
RetaliatoryDischarge, 67 WASH. L. REV. 893 (1992); Patricia O'Dell, Retaliatory Discharge:
Corporate Counsel in a Catch-22, 44 ALA. L. REV. 573 (1993) (summarizing the history of the
employment-at-will doctrine). O'Dell notes that the survival of American industry no longer
requires subversion of employee rights. In other words, when the American economy was
rapidly industrializing, there was more of a need for employers to be free to hire and fire
workers as they saw fit. Id. at 575-76. In today's post-industrialized economy there is less need
for employers to have the right to terminate employees at-will. Id. Furthermore:
The at-will rule has since suffered substantial erosion. First, and perhaps, most
importantly, unionization has increased job security.
Collective bargaining
agreements protect approximately twenty-five percent of the nonagricultural United
States labor force by forbidding the firing of unionized employees except for "cause"
or "just cause." Second, approximately nineteen percent of the United States work
force are federal, state, or local government employees, of whom the majority are
protected from arbitrary dismissal by civil service rules. A third form of protection
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employers' rights to conduct business without judicial interference and the
rights of the employee not to be terminated for improper reasons arose the
tort of wrongful discharge. Courts recognized this tort so that employers
could not coerce employees to forgo their rights at the expense of their
jobs." Employers had employees in the precarious position of being
dependant on their employers for their livelihood. Employers, however,
were not dependant on single employees because there were always others
to replace fired employees. Unfortunately, there were not always new jobs
for the fired employee. This situation has been likened to "that of a helpless
prisoner, caught between the employer's demand for active participation in
criminal or illegal actions and his own job security.""
In order to prove a wrongful termination claim, two elements must be
satisfied. First, a plaintiff must show that he was discharged in retaliation
for his activities on the job.' 4 Second, a plaintiff must show that the
discharge was in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy."5 For
in-house counsel, however, the rules of confidentiality and various rules of
professional responsibility sometimes make these elements difficult or
impossible to prove. The interplay between these two elements and in-house
counsel's professional duties are addressed throughout this Note.
B. The Public Policy Exception to Employment-at-Will
The public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine permits
in-house counsel to allege they were terminated for a reason that is contrary
to public policy. Essentially, counsel are claiming they were asked to do
something injurious to the public welfare or prohibited from doing something
that public policy has already determined is proper; for example, filing a
workers compensation claim. "Public policy wrongful termination claims are
pure creatures of law."' 6 The theoretical reason for labeling a discharge
wrongful in certain cases is not based on the terms and conditions of the
employment contract. Rather, it is based on a "duty implied in law on the
part of the employer to conduct its affairs in compliance with public

has come from a variety of statutes, beginning with the National Labor Relations Act

of 1935 that have established that employees may not be fired because of their
membership in particular protected classes.

Id. at 576 n.22 (quoting Note, ProtectingEmployees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The
PublicPolicy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1934 (1983)).
12. Abramson, supra note 7, at 272. See also O'Dell, supra note 11, at 577.

13. Seymour Moskowitz, Employment-At-Will & Codes of Ethics: The Professional's
Dilemma, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 33, 51 (1988).
14. Dianna Smith, Comment, The Effect of Rule 1.6 on the Professional Situation of InHouse Counsel, 18 J. LEGAL PROF. 299, 314 (1993).
15. Id.
16. General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 497 (Cal. 1994).
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The tort of wrongful termination reflects a duty imposed by law

upon all employers in order to implement the fundamental public policies
embodied in the state's penal statutes.'
A precise definition of public policy has never been set forth. However,
the California Court of Appeal, in Petermannv. InternationalBrotherhood

of Teamsters, Local 39619 offered the following explanation:

By "public policy," is intended that principle of law which holds that no
citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good. It is a principles under which freedom
of contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the good of the
community."0

The public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is an
evolving aspect of wrongful termination.

Indeed, what constitutes public

policy often determines the success of a wrongful termination claim. 2 This

determination of what constitutes public policy is at the heart of the General
17. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 376-77 (Cal. 1988).
18. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Cal. 1980). According to a
recent count, 43 jurisdictions have adopted the so-called retaliatory discharge cause of action as
a restraint on the employer's historic at-will power of termination. GeneralDynamics, 876 P.2d
at 497 (citing Sara Corello, Note, In House Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge,
92 COL. L. REv. 389, 394 (1992)). As an example ofjurisdictions that do not accept the public
policy exception to the terminable-at-will status of employees, see Waldermeyer v. ITT
Consumer Fin. Corp., 767 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Mo. 1991); Grant v. Butler, 590 So. 2d 254
(Ala. 1991); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Demarco v. Publix
Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. S. Ct. 1980); Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc., 320
S.E.2d 872 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss.
1981); Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983). Nina G.
Stillman, Wrongful Discharge: Contract,Public Policy and Tort Claims, in ANNUAL INSTITUTE
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW at 827 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 476,
1993).
19. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
20. Id. at 27. See also Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981)
finding:
When a discharge contravenes public policy in any way the employer has committed
a legal wrong ....

But what constitutes clearly mandated public policy? ...

It can

be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens
of the state collectively. It is to be found in the state's constitution and statutes and,
when they are silent, in its judicial decisions ....

The matter must strike at the

heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be
allowed.

Id. at 878-89.
21. See, e.g., Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (discharge for
a refusal to commit perjury at employer's request is a violation of public policy); Gantt v. Sentry
Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (discharge violated public policy where employer coerced
employee to lie during governmental investigation); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975)
(employee discharged because she served on a jury stated a cause for wrongful discharge);
Ludwick v. This Minute, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985) (employee discharged for honoring
a subpoena stated a claim for wrongful discharge). Other examples include filing suit against
an employer and refusal to commit or participate in an unlawful act or crime. Stillman, supra
note 18, at 834.
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Dynamics decision.
III. WRONGFUL TERMINATION AND LAWYERS

A. Cases Denying In-House Counsel the Right to Sue
Although the tort of wrongful discharge of non-attorney employees has
been accepted in most jurisdictions, when attorney employees such as inhouse counsel are involved, several jurisdictions have refused to allow them
to recover under a wrongful discharge theory.'
These jurisdictions have
deferred blindly to the attorney-client relationship in prohibiting in-house
counsel from going forward with their wrongful termination claims. In most
cases, they have done so without analyzing or addressing the impact this has
on both in-house counsel and the legal profession. Before undertaking a
discussion of these cases, it is helpful to break down attorney claims into two
categories; refusal and reporting cases. Refusal cases involve instances in
which the in-house counsel is fired for refusing to break a law or violate an
ethical mandate.' Reporting cases involve instances in which corporate inhouse counsel is fired for internally reporting illegal or fraudulent activity.24
Regardless of whether or not the in-house counsel reports or refuses to
participate in certain conduct, many problems and pitfalls await.
The leading case with respect to the rights of in-house counsel is Balla
v. Gambro.' In Balla, Gambro, Inc. was a distributor of kidney dialysis
machines manufactured by Gambro Germany.26 Balla was corporate inhouse counsel for Gambro, Inc., "responsible for all legal matters within the
company. "I Gambro Germany informed Gambro, Inc. that a shipment of
dialyzers was forthcoming. By letter they also advised Gambro, Inc. that the
dialyzers may not be effective for acute patients.' Gambro, Inc. accepted
these shipments, stating they would "sell them to a unit that is not currently
our customer but who buys only on price."
Balla, after learning about the dialyzer shipments, informed the president
of Gambro, Inc. that he would do whatever was necessary to stop the sale of

22. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2 and accompanying text.
23. Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed Counsel, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 553, 559-62; 576-79 (1988).
24. Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13. Rule 1.13
requires internal reporting action by the lawyer who discovers illegality meeting certain
predicates of seriousness. The Rule suggests an exhaustion of internal remedies approach,
advocating passing the information up the corporate ladder to the "highest authority that can act
in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law." Id.
25. 584 N.E.2d 104 (I11.App. Ct. 1991).
26. Id. at 105. The sale and manufacture of dialyzers is regulated by the United States
Food and Drug Administration. Id.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 106. Appellee informed the president of Gambro, Inc. to reject the shipments
because they did not comply with FDA regulations. Id.
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the dialyzers.29 Approximately one month later, Balla was discharged from
Gambro, Inc.3° He then filed a retaliatory discharge claim seeking damages
of $22 million. 3

At the outset, the Illinois Supreme Court found that Balla was discharged
"in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy." 32 However, the
court refused to grant in-house counsel the right to sue for wrongful

termination. 3 The court focused on the special relationship between
attorneys and clients and the requirement that attorneys adhere to certain
rules of ethical conduct.'
The court first noted that because of the
professional ethics rules attorneys are bound to follow, the public policy of
protecting the lives and property of citizens is adequately safeguarded
without
35
extending the tort of retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel.

The Illinois Supreme Court first noted that Rule 1.6(b) of the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct states that attorneys must reveal information
about a client if necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury.36
Therefore, because selling ineffective dialyzers could cause death or serious

injury, an in-house counsel would be required to report the "misbranded

and/or adulterated" dialyzers. 37 Because the attorney is required to report

such information, the court reasoned that in-house counsel do not have a
choice between following their ethical obligations as attorneys licensed to
practice law, or following the illegal and unethical demands of their
clients. 3 The court concluded that the public policy is already protected by

the attorney's ethical mandates-thus,
making the tort of wrongful discharge
39

available is unnecessary.
Furthermore, the court found that extending the tort of retaliatory

discharge to in-house counsel would impair the attorney-client relationship
29. Id.
30. Id. After he was terminated, appellee reported the shipment of the dialyzers to the
FDA. The FDA seized the shipment and determined that the dialyzers were adulterated within
the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 107-08. ("There is no public policy more important or fundamental than the one
favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens." (quoting Palmateer v.
Int'l Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876, 879 (II. 1981))).
33. Id. at 108.
34. Id. See also Herbster v. North American Co. for Health and Life Ins., 501 N.E.2d
343 (II1. App. Ct. 1990), discussed infra.
35. Id. at 108-09.
36. Id. at 109. ILL. RULES PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) reads: "A lawyer shall reveal
information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from
committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily injury."
37. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109. Note that the Illinois statute substitutes the word shall for
may which is how it appears in the Model Rules. ILL. RULE PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b).
California does not have a corresponding provision in its professional rules.
Illinois adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility. The numbers of the Illinois
statutes correspond with the "Code" numbers.
38. 584 N.E.2d at 108-09.
39. Id. at 190.
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that exists between in-house counsel and their employer. 4' This relationship
allows a client to discharge an attorney at any time, without cause.4' Such
a proposition "recognizes that the relationship between an attorney and client
is based on trust and that the client must have confidence in his attorney to
ensure that the relationship will function properly." 4" The court held that
if in-house counsel are given the right to sue their employers (clients),
employers might be less willing to be forthright and candid with their inhouse counsel.43
The court further noted that under the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct, Balla was required to withdraw from representing Gambro if his
continued representation would result in a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.' Additionally, the court noted that it would be
unfair and inappropriate for the employer/client to bear the economic costs
and burdens of their in-house counsel's adherence to their ethical obligations.4' Based on the foregoing reasons, the Illinois Supreme Court refused
to grant in-house counsel the right to sue for wrongful termination.:
The Balla court relied heavily on Herbsterv. North American Company
for Life and Health Insurance7 to reach its decision. In Herbster, the
plaintiff was employed as chief legal officer and vice president in charge of
the legal department for North American under an oral terminable-at-will
contract. He was fired for refusing to destroy or remove documents from
North America's files which had been requested in pending lawsuits against
North America in Federal District Court in Alabama.48 These documents
tended to support allegations of fraud against North American.49 Plaintiff
claimed that if he complied with the request to destroy the documents, he
would have been in violation of Rules 1-102(5) and 7-109(a) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 0
Although the court agreed that there were clearly matters of public

40. Id.
41. See Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 13 (Cal. 1972); Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 4748 (N.Y. 1916).
42. 584 N.E.2d at 108-09.

43. Id.
44. Id. at 110 (citing ILL. RULES PROF. CONDUCT Rules 1.16(a)(2) & (a)(4)).
45. 584 N.E.2d at 110.
46. Id. at 113. "We agree with the conclusion reached in Herbster that, generally, in-house
counsel do not have a claim under the tort of retaliatory discharge. However, we base our
decision as much on the nature and purpose of the tort of retaliatory discharge, as on the effect
on the attorney-client relationship that extending the tort would have." Id. at 108.
47. 501 N.E.2d 343 (111.App. Ct. 1986).

48. Id. at 344.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing ILL. RULES PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1-102(5)) (providing that a lawyer shall

not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Rule 7-109(a) provides
that a lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal
or produce).
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policy involved,"' it focused exclusively on the attorney-client relationship.
The court found that the policies surrounding the attorney's loyalty to the
client, the ability of the client to terminate the relationship at will and the
privileged and confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship all
militated against granting in-house counsel the right to sue for wrongful
termination.'
Another case which focused exclusively on an attorney's ethical
mandates without considering the ramifications of adhering to those mandates
is Willy v. Coastal Corporation.53 In Willy, the plaintiff claimed he was
terminated for attempts to cause his employer to comply with, or his refusal
to violate, state federal environmental and securities laws. The court found
that withdrawal from employment, as required under the Texas Code of
Professional Ethics,54 was a sufficient remedy for an attorney who did not
wish to violate the law. 55 The court failed to provide any relevant discussion or analysis on the issue.
These cases are correct in that they recognize the attorney-client
relationship as an important consideration in wrongful termination claims and
that attorneys perform an important function in society. These cases fail to
recognize, however, the unsatisfactory consequences that follow from a blind
reliance on the attorney-client relationship as the sole remedy. Accordingly,
these cases have been roundly criticized by numerous commentators and
ultimately, the California Supreme Court in General Dynamics.
B. Cases Granting a Limited Right to Sue
Certain other jurisdictions allow in-house counsel a limited right to bring
wrongful termination suits. Generally, these suits are based on contract
theories, not public policy mandates. None of these cases explicitly hold that
in-house counsel can maintain a suit for wrongful termination based on
purely public policy grounds. Some, however, do provide the necessary
insight and analysis to build upon in the future.

In Mourad v. Automobile Club Insurance Association,56 the plaintiff

was in-house counsel for the Automobile Club. He supervised the legal
department for three years before being demoted to an executive attorney
position.' Plaintiff eventually resigned and filed a retaliatory discharge suit

51. Id.
52. Id. at 346-48.
53. 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir.
1988).
54. See id. at 118 (citing Tax. RULES PROF. CONDUCT DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(c)).

55. Id.
56. 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
57. Id. at 397.
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against his employer.5" He claimed that he was constructively discharged5 9
because of his refusal to comply with alleged unethical and illegal orders
from individual defendants who were not attorneys. He further claimed that
if he had complied, he would have violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.'
The court based its decision to allow the plaintiff in-house counsel to sue
on the existence of an implied just-cause contract. 6 In its discussion, the
court distinguished cases which dealt with the question of whether a state will
recognize a public policy exception to the typical employment-at-will
contract.6' The court then expressly declined to address whether or not a
defendant could maintain a cause of action for wrongful discharge against an
employer for refusing to violate the attorney's code of professional
conduct.63
In Nordling v. Northern States Power Company,6' the plaintiff began
working for Northern States Power as an engineer. He also attended law
school with the company's help. After being admitted to the bar, he worked
for the defendant as in-house counsel.65 During the course of his employment, the plaintiff learned of a plan to investigate the personal lifestyles of
power company employees at a new facility. The plan consisted of
surveillance of employees at home and on the site of the plant.66 After
informing his superiors about this plan, the plaintiff was discharged. 67
The Nordling court held that in-house counsel should not be precluded
from maintaining an action for breach of a contractual provision in an
employee handbook, provided that the essentials of the attorney-client
relationship are not compromised.6" The court noted that the in-house
counsel is an employee, much like any other corporate employee at the
executive level. "His employer controls the hours he works, the salary and
benefits he receives, and the work to which he is assigned." 69 Therefore,
58. The plaintiff's suit also included a cause of action based on breach of a just-cause
contract among other claims. Although this Note is not concerned with actions based on
contractual grounds, this case is instructive for what it specifically does not address: the right
to sue based on public policy grounds. Id. at 399.
59. Constructive discharge occurs when an employer makes work conditions so intolerable
or reduces an employee's responsibility to such a level that the employee is forced to quit. See,

e.g., Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981).

60. Mourad, 465 N.W.2d at 397.
61. Id. at 400. See supra note 6.
62. Id. at 399. The court was distinguishing the Willy, Herbster, and Parker decisions.
See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 401, 403.
64. 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).
65. Id. at 499.
66. Id. at 500.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 502. "Obviously an in-house attorney is not excused from keeping privileged
communications confidential just because he is in-house." Id. at 503.
69. Id. at 501.
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the court concluded, "there is no reason to deny the job security aspects of

the employer-employee relationship" if this can be done without destroying
the attorney-client relationship.70

With respect to a right to sue for wrongful termination based on public
policy grounds, the court stated: "We do not have a Balla-type situation here

and we do not think it prudent to speculate on how we might rule in a case
not before us."" However, the court in dicta gave some indication of how
they might rule on such a "Balla-type" issue. It found that a wrongful
discharge claim is more likely to implicate the attorney-client relationship
than a contract-based claim. Specifically, wrongful discharge claims may
7
involve revelation of client confidences that relate to client wrongdoing. 2
Conversely, the court noted that the plaintiff had failed to identify any federal
or state law or rule which his employer violated.' Thus, if the plaintiff
could have identified a specific violation of law, then the Minnesota Supreme

Court might have upheld a retaliatory discharge claim based on public policy.
In Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc.,' the in-house counsel plaintiff

was constructively discharged after refusing to copy documents surreptitiously obtained from a competitor pertaining to a competitor's trade secret. The

documents were under the protective order of a district court judge.75 The
plaintiff claimed he was engaging in conduct protected by the Conscientious
Employee Protection Act ("Whistle Blowers' Act").76 The court held that
an attorney has a claim under the Whistle Blowers' Act even though this act

70. Id. at 502.
71. Id. at 503.
72. Id.
73. Id. The statute cited by the plaintiff is generally known as a whistleblower statute. It
reads, in pertinent part, that an employer shall not discharge an employee because "the employee
in good faith, reports a violation or suspected violation of any federal or state law or rule
adopted pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement
official." Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (1990). The court found that the idea of
surveillance seems distasteful and may be ill-advised, but that does not mean it is illegal.
74. 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
75. Id. at 217.
76. Id. at 218. The "Whistle Blowers' Act", N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 subsections 3(a) and (c)
prohibit retaliatory action against an employee who:
a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity,
policy or practice of the employer that the employee reasonably believes is in
violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law,
c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity,
policy or practice which the
employee reasonably believes:
(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated
pursuant to law;
(2) is fraudulent or criminal; or
(3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning
the public health, safety or welfare.
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was passed by the legislature and was not an ethical stricture promulgated by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 77 However, the court did not rule on
whether ethical mandates, promulgated by the supreme court of a state, could
constitute a public policy, thereby justifying an action by in-house counsel
for retaliatory discharge.
None of these courts went as far as GeneralDynamics in recognizing a
common law right for in house-counsel to sue their employers. Some of the
courts expressly prohibited such suits. 78 The General Dynamics court
examined both the flaws and the strengths of the preceding cases, fashioning
a limited common law right for in-house counsel to79 sue their employers for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
IV. GENERAL DYNAMICS V. SUPERIOR COURT

Andrew Rose began working in General Dynamics' legal department as
a contract administrator in 1978. 0 After fourteen years in the organization
during which he earned repeated commendations, Rose was abruptly fired for
what General Dynamics claimed was Rose's inability to represent the
corporation's interests vigorously."' Rose alleged that he was fired for
reasons that violated fundamental public policies. First, Rose alleged that he
was terminated because he spearheaded an investigation into employee drug
use, which led to the dismissal of more than sixty employees.' Second, he
alleged that he was terminated because he protested the company's failure to

77. Parker, 566 A.2d at 222.
78. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2 and accompanying text.
79. For an interesting view with respect to wrongful termination claims brought by in-house
counsel, see Rodney M. Confer, ProfessionalTenure as a Means to Promote Ethical Compliance
in the Civil Discovery Process, 59 NEB. L. REV. 35 (1980). Mr. Confer's general proposition
is that even if a wrongful discharge action were available to attorneys, in-house counsel would
not act any differently and would still disobey the law. He further asserts that the organizational
employer may be the motivating force behind the termination in the first place. Id. at 40. He
notes that even if a lawyer was pressured into unethical behavior, that lawyer would lack the
courage and conviction to resist the organization in a lawsuit. Id. He further assumes that inhouse counsel would resist pressure placed upon them by an organizational client, whether or
not they can pursue a wrongful discharge action. Id. Finally, Mr. Confer cavalierly comments:
[A] certain number of suits brought by discharged attorneys would undoubtedly lack
merit. In these instances, the incompetents, crackpots and other undesireables of the
bar would be in the public spotlight, since these lawyers are the most likely to be
discharged, and probably the least likely to understand when they had been fired for
good reason. . . With attorneys on either side trying to discredit the attorney on the
other side, the worst aspects of law practice and the worst elements of the bar would
be the most visible to the public ....

Before we air our dirtiest laundry in public

view, we should carefully weigh whether the benefits which might accrue would
make this price worth paying.
Id. at 39.
80. General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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investigate the bugging of the chief security officer's office.83 Third, he
alleged he was terminated because of General Dynamics' displeasure
regarding Rose's advice that the company's salary policy might be in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, possibly exposing the firm to
several hundred million dollars in backpay claims.'
In a unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court held that inhouse counsel can bring a common law tort claim for retaliatory discharge
if they are forced to contravene their mandatory ethical obligations.'
Further, if the attorney's conduct is merely ethically permissible, but not
required by statute or ethical code, then the attorney may bring a wrongful
termination so long as a non-attorney employee could maintain such an
action. 6 However, the attorney must point to a statute or ethical provision
that allows her to depart from the rules of confidentiality. 7
This decision extends the rights of in-house counsel beyond that of any
state in the nation; even states which have extended some modicum of
protection such as Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. s
Instead of clarifying the law of wrongful termination as it relates to in-house
counsel, however, this decision raises questions and uncertainties. For
example, can in-house counsel reveal the information necessary to establish
a wrongful termination claim under existing law? If not, are there alternative
methods to allow in-house counsel to reveal the necessary information?
A. In-House Counsel vs. Independent Attorney
The California Supreme Court described the rise in the number of
corporate in-house counsel in society today. The court noted large
corporations increasingly have turned inward for the acquisition of legal
services. Reasons for this rise include cost incentives, the increasing
complexity of the regulatory environment, and the programmatic nature of

83. The court noted that this was allegedly a criminal offense because it involved a major
defense contractor and constituted a serious breach of national security. Id.
84. Id. at 491. The case was remanded to the trial court. Therefore, there was no decision
on the merits of this suit regarding whether the claims, as pleaded, rose to the level of a
cognizable public policy. For an interesting debate between Myron Klarfeld, Rose's attorney
and Norman Krivosha, chairman of the American Corporate Counsel Association and a former
chief justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court, see Nina Schuyler, Identity Crisis: Should
Employment Law ProtectIn-House Counselfrom the Managers Who Hire Them, 14 CAL. LAW.
45, June 1994.
85. GeneralDynamics, 876 P.2d at 490.
86. Id.
87. Id. "In those instances where attorney-employee's retaliatory discharge claim is
incapable of complete resolution without breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit may not
proceed." Id.
88. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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such organizations." The court then went on to note a crucial distinction
between in-house counsel and independent lawyers. 90
Unlike the law firm partner, who typically possesses a significant measure
of economic independence and professional distance derived from a
multiple client base, the economic fate of the in-house counsel is tied
directly to a single employer, at whose sufferance they serve. Thus, from
an economic standpoint, the dependence of in-house counsel is indistinguishable from that of other corporate managers or senior executives who
also owe their livelihoods and career goals and satisfaction to a single
organizational employer. 91

The court reasoned that because of the unique circumstances of in-house
counsel, they should be entitled to a greater degree of protection than that
afforded to independent counsel.
The general rule with respect to the attorney-client relationship in
California, as set forth in Fracassev. Brent,91 has been that "the client's
power to discharge an attorney, with or without cause, is absolute. . .

.93

The court in General Dynamics took care to note that the specific facts of
Fracassedealt with a lawyer seeking compensation for being fired by his
client. The relationship was based on a contingent fee agreement. 94 The
court described this relationship as one of the most common of the traditional
forms of the lawyer-client relationship. The court described it as a potential
claimant who seeks redress by hiring an independent professional to
prosecute her claim for personal injuries. 95 The court then noted that while
Fracassegrants a personal injury client the absolute right to unilaterally
discharge his attorney, it does not follow that all clients under all circumstances have the absolute right to unilaterally terminate the attorney-client

89. Id. at 491. The court also referred to a study conducted in the early 1980's, finding
that fifty-thousand lawyers were on corporate payrolls, a figure double that of fifteen years
earlier. A more recent survey indicates that more than 10 percent of all lawyers in the United
States are employed in-house by corporations. See also Nordling v. Northern States Power Co.,
478 N.W.2d 498, 502 n.3 (Minn 1991) (In-house counsel comprise about 10 percent of the bar
and their presence seems to be increasingly felt). For a discussion of how many organizations
have high-powered in house legal departments that rival elite law firms in size, qualifications,
and expertise of attorneys, and compensation, see Grace M. Giesel, The Ethics or Employment
Dilemma of In-house Counsel, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535, 541-44 (1992); and Mary C. Daly,
Ethical Challenges for Law Departments in the Twenty-First Century, in SEVENTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE OF CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT:

CONTROLLING AND REDUCING

COSTS 227 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 833, 1993).
90. The term "independent" in this context connotes independence from a particular
corporation, including associates and partners within a law firm, as well as sole practitioners.
91. General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d at 491.
92. Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972). For a continuing validation of this general
principle see Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142, 1159 (Cal.
1994).
93. Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 13.
94. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 492.
95. Id.
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relationship.96 The distinct roles played by in-house counsel and independent counsel and the related limitation on the unfettered right of a client to
discharge his attorney at will, which arises from the differing roles played
by in-house counsel, forms the backbone of the court's decision to grant inhouse counsel a limited right to sue for wrongful termination.
The California Supreme Court, in GeneralDynamics, went on to discuss
three criteria that must be met in order to bring a wrongful termination
claim. First, "the public policy at issue must be not only fundamental, but
clearly established in the Constitution and the positive law of the state."
Judge-made law or other sources are not included.' Second, "even if the
requirement is established by positive law, the policy subserved by the
employee's conduct must be a truly public one, that is, affect[ing] a duty
which inures to the benefit of the public at large rather than to a particular
employer or employee."98 Third, decisions recognizing a tort action for
discharge in violation of public policy must "seek to protect the public, by
protecting the employee who refuses to commit a crime .

. . ,

who reports

criminal activity to proper authorities, or who discloses other illegal, unethical, or unsafe practices." 99 Thus, because in-house counsel's role is
intrinsically different than that of independent counsel, in-house counsel
should be allowed to maintain a cause of action for wrongful discharge as
long as the three criteria discussed above are satisfied.
B. Public Policy as It Relates to In-House Counsel
The GeneralDynamics court reasoned that the doctrine of public policy
is especially relevant with regard to attorneys, specifically with regard to inhouse counsel."

The legal profession requires an attorney to recognize

On the one hand, an attorney's highest duty is to the
a dual allegiance.'
welfare and interests of the client. This obligation, however, is constrained
by specific professional qualifications. In other words, attorneys are bound
96. Id. at 493. In fact, an unqualified immunity from any liability for terminating in house
counsel is inconsistent with laws pertaining to anti-discrimination and statutory rights to public
collective bargaining. Golightly-Howell v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 806 F. Supp. 921,
924 (D. Colo. 1992) ("[Blecause Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race or sex, it
prohibits such discrimination against one employed as in house counsel."); Santa Clara County
Counsel Atys. Assn., 869 P.2d at 1160 (the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act creates an exception to
the general rule that a client may discharge an attorney at will).
97. Id. at 497 (citing Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992)). But see
Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981) (reasoning that when the state
constitution and statutes are silent, it is permissible to look to judicial decisions).
98. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497 (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373, 379 (Cal. 1988)).
99. Id. (quoting Foley, 765 P.2d at 380). The General Dynamics court noted that the
doctrinal foundation of the public policy tort claim is not so much the plaintiff's continued
interest in employment as the preservation of the public interest as expressed in multiple forms
in the Constitution and statutory law. Id.
100. See supra section I.B.
101. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 498.
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to adhere to a handful of professional ethical norms that distinguish their
work from that of the non-attorney.'02
Some of these professional norms incorporate important public values
that may affect the public interest at large. 103 This dual-allegiance dilemma
is particularly relevant in the context of a large, commercially-driven
corporation whose essential objectives are defined by profit maximization."
In such a business culture, in-house counsel may be trapped
between the desire to further the goals of the client-employer, and restrictions
on conduct imposed by ethical norms prescribed by the Rules of Professional
Conduct. 5 In-house counsel, unlike outside counsel, do not have the
amount of professional distance and economic independence that could serve
to lessen pressure to circumvent professional norms." 6
Thus, from the foregoing discussion it becomes clear that in-house
counsel, perhaps even more clear than regular corporate employees, require
shielding from retaliation by employers who either insist that they violate
their mandatory ethical norms or terminate them for refusing to violate those
norms.1 7 Because of the public interest inherent in the legal profession, inhouse counsel are even more vulnerable liable to conflicts between corporate
goals and professional norms than their non-attorney colleagues.'
Therefore, in-house counsel, forced to choose between the demands of the
employer and the requirements of a professional code of ethics have, if
anything, an even more powerful claim to judicial protection than their nonattorney colleagues.0 9
C. Elements of a RetaliatoryDischarge Claim
With the recognition that in-house counsel are generally entitled to the
same rights as other corporate employees, the California Supreme Court
carved out a limited right for in-house counsel to sue their client/employer
102. Id. These minimal ethical standards that define the lawyer as a professional are
embodied in the California Rules of Professional Conduct. The court expressly declined to adopt
either the Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a predicate for retaliatory discharge claims. These rules have "ho legal force of their own"
and have never been adopted by the California Supreme Court. Id. at 503 n.6.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. This distinguishing feature, a recurrent theme, is the complete dependence on the
good will and confidence of a single employer to provide livelihood and career success. See
also Daly, supra note 89 (suggesting prophylactic measures designed to promote a culture of
high ethical standards within corporate law departments and minimize ethical transgressions).
107. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 498.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also Joseph J. Fleischman et al., The OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines
and the Employment At-Will Rule as Applied to In-House Counsel, 48 BUs. LAW 611, 613 (1993)
(noting that "the government has signaled to lawyers that it is simply not enough to advise
clients against certain actions; the government now expects lawyers to be proactive in meeting
their reporting and disclosing obligations").
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for wrongful termination, based on public policy grounds. The court held
that in-house counsel can bring a wrongful termination suit against their

employer when they are discharged for following a mandatory ethical
obligation prescribed by a professional rule or statute.110 If that is the case,

then "under most circumstances, the attorney would have a retaliatory
discharge cause of action against the employer.""'

If a court determines

that the conduct in which the employer has engaged is merely ethically
permissible, but not required by statute or ethical code, the court must then
determine two additional criteria. First, whether the employer's conduct
would give rise to a retaliatory discharge action by a non-attorney employee
under Gantt v. Sentry Insurance.112 Second, a court must determine
whether some statute or ethical rule specifically permits the attorney to depart

from the usual requirement of confidentiality with respect to the clientemployer." 3 The court took care to emphasize the limited scope of their

decision, expressly holding that the tort remedy available to attorneys is by
no means coextensive with the right available to non-attorney employees." 4
Furthermore, the court made clear that the scope of the confidentiality

privilege will not be diluted in the context of in-house counsel. Thus, where
the elements of a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim
cannot be established without breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit
must be dismissed. 1 5

V. THE IMPACT AND EFFECT OF GENERAL DYNAMICS
In GeneralDynamics, the California Supreme Court took a momentous

110. GeneralDynamics, 876 P.2d at 502. For example, being asked to directly contravene
a rule under the Rules of Professional Conduct or being asked to commit a crime that would
subject the in-house counsel to disbarment under statute. The court used Bus. PROF. CODE §
6101 (providing for disbarment on conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude) and § 6106 (providing for disbarment for the "commission of any act involving moral
turpitude, dishonesty or corruption.").
111. GeneralDynamics, 876 P.2d at 503.
112. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992) (the public policy at issue must
be one that is not only fundamental, but is also clearly established in the constitution and positive
law of the state). General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503.
Note that by equating the attorney's conduct to a non-attorney employee, the General
Dynamics court is enunciating a common law standard upon which attorneys can sue their
employer for wrongful termination.
113. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503. See also CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 956-958 (West
Supp. 1994).
114. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503.
115. Id. at 503-04. The court briefly noted three further restrictions on an in-house
counsel's right to sue. First, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the requirements of
the ethical norm at issue and that the employer's conduct was motivated by impermissible
considerations under a "but for" standard of causation (disagreements over policy are not
actionable). Second, the ethical norm at issue must be intended for the protection of the public
at large, not solely for the benefit of the attorney or the client. Third, an attorney who
unsuccessfully brings a retaliatory discharge claim and discloses client confidences, may be
subject to State Bar disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 504.
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step forward in extending the common law tort of retaliatory discharge to inhouse counsel. The court went even further by allowing in-house counsel to
bring a retaliatory discharge claim for the same reasons that a non-attorney
could bring such a claim. In so doing, the court recognized the relatively
equal economic positions enjoyed by corporate in-house counsel and regular
corporate employees." 6 The court addressed many of the flaws inherent
in the prior case law regarding wrongful discharge of in-house counsel. The
court, however, created uncertainties in the process, and did not expand the
rights of in-house counsel as far as it would first appear.
A. Hobson's Choice: Report or Withdraw Without Remedy
There are two major flaws common throughout the cases restricting inhouse counsel's right to sue for wrongful termination. First is the assumption that because ethical rules require in-house counsel to report an
employer's illegal conduct or to withdraw from representation, they should
not be entitled to reasonable compensation for being wrongfully terminated.
Second is the hollow, conclusory reliance on the sanctity of the attorneyclient relationship as an impenetrable barrier to bringing an action for
retaliatory discharge.'
The California Supreme Court, in General Dynamics, adequately
addressed these two flaws. The court recognized that it is patently unfair to
leave only one option to an attorney who has taken the "high road" of
refusing to violate his ethical duty." 8 That option is to withdraw.1" 9
They further recognized that it is unfair to leave an attorney without a
remedy simply because he is required by his ethical duties to report a
violation."' ° Indeed, Mourad'2 ' implicitly recognized this policy. In

116. Id. at 490.
117. See, e.g., X Corp. v. John Doe, 816 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Va. 1993). In fact, these
assumptions are explicitly set forth in the Balla decision. Interestingly, the Illinois Court of
Appeals reached a contrary decision which extended the rights of in-house counsel to sue for
wrongful termination, but did not sweep as broadly as GeneralDynamics. The appellate court

found that the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege is not an absolute bar to disclosure of

client confidences. Disclosure is mandated by certain rules in the Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility. After balancing the competing public policies of the attorney-client privilege
versus protecting individuals from serious bodily harm, the court found clear support in favor
of disclosing information when the attorney reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent serious
bodily harm or death. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 1043 (III. App. Ct. 1990). See also
Abramson, supra note 7, at 281.
118. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502.
119. Id. (referring to Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116, 118 (S.D. Tex. 1986));
see also Herbster v. North American Co. Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 348 (111.App.
Ct. 1990).
120. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109. Note that the California Supreme Court characterized the
previous court's pronouncements of the "choice" of voluntary withdraw as bland announcements
that do not take the extraordinarily high cost of resignation into account. General Dynamics,
876 P.2d at 502.
121. 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
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discussing in-house counsel's right to sue for breach of an implied-in-fact
contract claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that "by hiring plaintiff
as an attorney, defendants knew or should have known that plaintiff was
bound by the code of professional conduct and incorporated this fact in
This analysis applies
creating a just-cause employment contract.""
equally in a wrongful discharge public policy claim. The employer hires inhouse counsel knowing full well that the counsel are bound by the rules of
professional conduct. Therefore, in requiring their in-house counsel to act
contrary to those rules, and terminating counsel if they refuse or report the
employer's actions to the proper authorities, the employer must be made to
compensate the employee.
Furthermore, in granting in-house counsel the right to sue for wrongful
termination, the court correctly took into consideration the economic situation
of in-house counsel. By definition, in-house counsel serve at the direction
of one client/employer.Iu They do not possess the independence derived
from a multiple-client base. Therefore, their economic plight is indistinguishable from that of other corporate managers or executives.12 4
This economic situation has even more force in the present economy
where replacement attorneys are readily available. More and more attorneys
are finding it difficult to secure employment after leaving law school. At the
same time, established lawyers who are being dismissed or laid off are
seeking the same jobs. This glut of eligible employees and the limited
number of employers leads to the inescapable conclusion, properly recognized by the California Supreme Court, that in-house counsel deserve
reasonable compensation if wrongfully terminated."Z
Another, more insidious, by-product of the rigid rule requiring
withdrawal or mandatory reporting without remedy, is that instead of
reporting a violation or withdrawing, an in-house counsel may find silence
the better part of valor. In house-counsel, aware of the harsh results of
withdrawal, will choose to be silent in order to retain their position. This
reality is an unfortunate outgrowth of the present economic situation, the role
122. Id. at 400. See also supra notes 2, 6, 56-79 and accompanying text.
123. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 490-91 ("mhe economic fate of in-house attorneys
is tied directly to a single employer, at whose sufferance they serve.").
124. Id.
125. See also Abramson, supra note 7, at 279; Stephen Gillers, Protecting Lawyers Who
Just Say No, 5 GEO. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1988):
Both Herbster and Willy emphasized the lawyer's ability or duty to withdraw.
I find that emphasis the most disturbing part of their rationales. It is disturbing
because the ability to leave the employment is equally true of all other retaliatory
discharge plaintiffs and because it cavalierly ignores the plaintiff's argument, which
is that withdraw for a single-client lawyer, especially one in mid-career, may be
tantamount to professional banishment.
The California Supreme Court addressed this issue by extending the right of in house counsel
to sue for wrongful termination to instances in which non-attorney employees could. General
Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 490.
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of in-house counsel in the legal profession, and the rules that govern attorney
conduct. 2 6 In a footnote, the General Dynamics court noted that despite
the fact that no more than a handful of wrongful termination cases have been
reported nationally, scholarly comment on the issues raised in retaliatory
discharge tort claims by in-house counsel is disproportionally large. 127
Perhaps this is an implicit recognition and acceptance of the fact that in-house
counsel may choose to remain silent in order to maintain their economic
footing. By providing the employee with a remedy in tort damages for
resisting socially-damaging organizational conduct, courts can mitigate the
otherwise considerable economic and cultural pressures on the individual to
silently conform." Attorney withdrawal in this situation is not an unavoidable circumstance that an employer encounters, such as is a conflict of
interest. The withdrawal is the direct result of the attorney's sole employer
requiring that attorney to violate his ethical mandates or, similarly, putting
him in a position in which he is forced to choose between breaching an
ethical mandate or continued employment. In the end, the California
Supreme Court recognized that just as nonlawyer employees are not required
to quietly surrender their jobs rather than "go along" with an employer's
unlawful demands, lawyers should also not be forced.2 9

126. Indeed, the California Supreme Court noted that: "Even the most dedicated
professionals, their economic and professional fate allied with that of the business organizations
they serve, may be irresistibly tempted to cut comers by bending the ethical norms that regulate
an attorney's professional conduct." General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 492. See also Giesel,
supra note 89, at 536-37. Professor Giesel observed that:
Exalted statements that most in-house counsel possess such high ethical
standards that economic pressure cannot sway them, no matter how great, are,
unfortunately, suspect ....
The perspective [of this author] is not that mankind and
womankind are inherently evil, but neither is it that all are inherently good. My
position is one which recognizes that economic pressures can tempt individuals....
The economic pressure on in-house attorneys as a class, however, does create an
atmosphere in which those attorneys may subordinate standards of responsibility more
often.
Geisel, supra note 89, at 536-37. See also Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104, 113 (Iii. 1991)
(Freeman, J., dissenting):
[T]o say that the categorical nature of ethical obligations is sufficient to ensure
that the ethical obligations will be satisfied simply ignores reality. Specifically, it
ignores that, as unfortunate for society as it may be, attorneys are no less human than
nonattomeys and, thus, no less given to the temptation to either ignore or rationalize
away their ethical obligations when complying therewith may render them unable to
feed and support their families.
Id.
127. GeneralDynamics, 876 P.2d at 500 n.5.
128. Id. at 501.
129. Id. See also Robert B. Fitzpatrick & Kathleen H. Kim, The Duty of Confidentiality:
May an Attorney Sue His or Her FormerEmployer and Divulge Client Confidences Obtained
During the Course ofHis or Her Employment?, 932 A.L.I. CURRENT DEVs. EMPLOYMENT LAW
333, 336 (1994) (citing Job Rights Issue Splits Corporate Counsel Group, LEGAL TIMEs, May
16, 1994, at 16)) (noting that the American Corporate Council Association took a stand on the
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B. The Sanctity of the Attorney-Client Relationship

The attorney-client relationship, which is based on trust and loyalty,
should not act as a complete bar to a wrongful termination suit brought by
in-house
counsel. 13This is precisely
the position adopted by the courts in
30
1 32

Balla,

Herbster, 1 and Willy.

The California Supreme Court not-

ed that the bar to wrongful termination suits is based on the common law
rule that a client can terminate the relationship with his attorney at any time
for any reason.13 The court further correctly recognized that this rule,
which is predicated on the relationship of an independent lawyer with a
multiple client base does not equally apply to in-house counsel who have but
a single client.

Because of the separate and distinct roles of in-house

counsel, blind adherence to this proposition would act to unfairly prejudice
in-house counsel.
Some argue that permitting wrongful termination suits by in-house
counsel would have an undesirable effect on the attorney-client relationship

because employers might be less forthright and candid with their in-housecounsel. Further, clients may be hesitant to turn to them for advice
regarding potentially questionable conduct. This argument is illogical when
analyzed in the context of the attorney's professional mandates. For
example, if in-house counsel is required to withdraw from representation, 34 or is required by the Rules of Professional Conduct to report
certain employer conduct, 3 1 then the employer will similarly be more
reluctant to confide in their in house-counsel. An employer is presumably
aware that in-house counsel are required, under their ethical mandates, to
thwart the employer's unquestionably illegal goals. On the other hand, most
topic of wrongful termination claims by in-house counsel in 1991. The policy adopted
recognizes a right to sue for breach of contract actions, but the policy also says lawyers cannot
sue if the firing arose from a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or if bringing
suit would require privileged information to be introduced into evidence.).
130. 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill.
1991).
131. 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
132. 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986). For a criticism of this proposition see
Abramson, supra note 7, at 276. Professor Abramson notes that the court in Herbster focused
on the trust and confidence the client reposes in the attorney, noting the evils arising from client
distrust. This trust and confidence, however, does not refer to some blind willingness to engage
in any conduct the client wishes. Id.
133. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See also Nordling v. Northern States
Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Minn. 1991) ("If the attomey-client relationship is to work,
the client must confide in the attorney, trusting that he will keep confidences and ably perform.
If the client loses this confidence, whether justifiably or not, the client must be able, without
penalty, to end the relationship."); Parker v. M & T Chem., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 218 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (finding that in New Jersey, "we are deeply committed to the
principle that an employer's right to discharge an employee carries a correlative duty to protect
his freedom to perform an act that would constitute a violation of a clear mandate of public
policy.") (citations omitted).
134. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. at 118.
135. See Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991); Herbster v. North American, 501
N.E. 2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
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employers who seek advice from in-house counsel do so to assure themselves
they are complying with the law, not to disobey the law. Thus, those
companies that seek to obey the law will be just as open and forthright with
in-house counsel whether or not they have a right to sue for wrongful
discharge.136

The attorney-client relationship is only impaired with the

company or employer who condones unlawful acts. 37

Therefore, the parameters of the relationship between the organization
and the in-house counsel are or should be fully understood by the employer.13 8 If the employer chooses to use its inside counsel as a pawn to
further or conceal illegal conduct, knowing that the employee is required to
report or refuse to undertake39 such conduct, the employer should be made to

compensate that employee. 1
Commentators have recognized that inside counsel have a responsibility
to promote the long-term interests of the corporation and to "forestall the
company offending public opinion through acts that indicate social indifference or social irresponsibility.""' Similarly, "in-house counsel has a
greater ability to alter their client's behavior and thus a corresponding duty
to use that ability to promote constructive behavior." 4 ' Furthermore, it

136. See Smith, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
137. Id.
138. See generally Kenneth J. Wilbur, Wrongful DischargeofAttorneys: A Cause of Action
to FurtherProfessionalResponsibility, 92 DICK. L. REv. 777 (1988).
139. Balla is a perfect example. In-house counsel for Gambro advised against accepting
a shipment of dialyzers because the shipment was in violation of the law. The in-house counsel
was terminated for reporting the contaminated shipment. Under the applicable Professional
Rules in Illinois, counsel was required to report this conduct. ILL. RULES PROF. CONDUCT,
Rule 1.6(b). Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d at 106, 109. Presumably, an employer knows that
in house counsel are governed by certain ethical mandates. Therefore, there is no difference
with respect to the employer being willing and forthright to discuss questionable conduct with
their counsel if they know the lawyer is required to disclose such information than if the
employer knows their counsel can bring a suit for wrongful termination. In both instances,
counsel will come forward and reveal the client's illegal conduct. There should be no
discernible impact on the attorney-client relationship, unless the employer expects his counsel
to blindly follow his mandates in contravention of the lawyer's ethical duty.
Furthermore, as Professor Abramson notes, "once a retaliatory discharge has occurred [the
relationship between the client and the in-house counsel] has been severed and the practical
question ... becomes who shall bear the cost." Abramson, supra note 7, at 276-77.
140. Corello, supra note 18, at 409 (citing Brian D. Forrow, The Corporate Law
Department Lawyer: Counsel to the Entity, in MANAGEMENT FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 43, 56
(J.
David Silvers et al. eds., 1985)).
141. Id. Note that there are some problems in this regard. For example:
A lawyer 'employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents'. . . . mhis fact may 'put the corporate lawyer
in the untenable position of representing a client to whom the lawyer cannot speak, while
speaking only to people who cannot be clients.' Accordingly, in-house lawyers may
confront the tensions between their zealous representation of the corporation and their
desire to please the corporate officers with whom they work and who, in many cases, may
be in positions to influence the lawyer's compensation or continued employment. This
tension is most aggravated when a lawyer learns that corporate officers or employees (to
whom the lawyer may report) intend to pursue, or have already engaged in, a course of
conduct that may result in criminal liability for the organization. In that case, lawyers may
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should be a corporation's goal to maximize its profits within the bounds of

the law and without harming the public. In order to achieve this, the
organization needs to obtain and follow honest and forthright advice from its
in-house counsel. 42 These corresponding goals and responsibilities should

act to enhance the relationship between an organization and its in-house
counsel, not inhibit trust or confidence.' 43 "The cost to a company of
preventing in-house counsel from doing their job and allowing inadvertent

violations is very high, given the increasing number of regulations controlling corporate behavior. '' 44
One commentator noted that the contention that an attorney should not
have the action of retaliatory discharge available because of public policy

intangibles such as trust and confidence respecting the attorney-client
relationship is really "just knee-jerk formalism. It amounts to spurious
glorification and romanticization of the actual roles and positions of corporate
attorneys by fellow lawyers, i.e. judges."45

The California Supreme

Court transforms this "glorification and romanticism" into reality by
recognizing that there are limitations to the attorney-client relationship.
Should employers continue to use this relationship as a sword against the
employee-counsel, then in California, in-house counsel will now have the
same right to use such relationship as a shield against employers, protecting

find their advice in conflict with the personal objectives of managers.
Fleischman et. al., supra note 109, at 616-17.
142. The court in Nordling recognized that "[a] client retains a lawyer to give sound advice
even when that advice may not be what the client wants to hear. The knowledgeable client
understands and, it is hoped, values in house counsel's independence. . .

."

Nordling v.

Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Minn. 1991). This is an implicit recognition
that it is in the organization's best interest to adhere to advice that in most instances will benefit
it in the long run as opposed to discounting that advice, injuring itself in some way and in the
process, terminating a valuable employee who was simply acting for the betterment of the
organization. For an example of a situation in which it is advantageous to follow in-house
counsel's advice see Fleischman et al., supra note 109, at 621. In the context of organizational
sentencing guidelines for corporate misconduct, self-reporting by the organization is encouraged.
By self-reporting, a company may avoid prosecution, may affect the number and types of counts
filed against the corporation, and, if prosecuted, may receive leniency. Id.
143. Once again, the Nordling court implicitly recognized that the attorney-client
relationship should not act as a complete bar to a wrongful termination suit. They stated that
the in house attorney is also a company employee. "[W]e see no reason to deny the job security
aspects of the employer-employee relationship if this can be done without violence to the
integrity of the attorney-client relationship." Id. at 502. Obviously, the court envisioned
circumstances in which this can be done.
144. Fleischman et. al., supra note 109, at 615-16. See also Reynolds, supra note 23, at
580; Larry Smith, In-House Counsel: New Targetfor Malpractice Actions, 12 No. 3 PRENT.
HALL OF COUNSEL 5 (1993) (noting that recently the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") blamed an in-house counsel for Salomon Inc., for not ordering an investigation into
certain criminal bidding activities. The SEC report stated the in-house counsel should have gone
to the authorities or, if necessary, resigned. One enforcement director of the SEC said, "we
made a strong statement and companies might expect some action against in-house counsel in
the future." The director denied that the SEC is "trying to redefine in-house counsel as whistleblowers." Id.).
145. Abramson, supra note 7, at 278.
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themselves from wrongful termination.
C. Public Policy: An Extension
Commentators and courts alike have argued that rules of professional
conduct do contain mandates of public policy.'
One argument in favor
of this view is that the nature of the professional's work, and society's
interest in such ethical conduct, provides a basis for a public policy exception
to the employee-at-will rule. 47 Another argument is that, as professionals, lawyers are impressed with the public trust; charged by state licensing
procedures and their own professional codes with using their particular
expertise for the greater good of the general public. 48 In extending the
tort of retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel, the GeneralDynamics court
adopted the approach of recognizing ethical codes as public policy. In
California, this public policy is found in "explicit and unequivocal ethical
norms embodied in the [California] Rules of Professional Responsibility and
certain provisions of the Business and Professions Code."'
While the recognition of ethical codes as a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine is an important step, the General Dynamics
court went one step further and did something that only one court to date has
done with respect to public policy as it relates to in-house counsel. The
court extended the right of in-house counsel to sue for wrongful termination
based on claims which are maintainable by the non-attorney employee, that
is, claims delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions of the laws of
California. 50

146. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980). See also
Giesel, supra note 89, at 570-74; Moskowitz, supra note 13, at 34. But c.f. McGonagle v.
Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878, 884-85 (Pa. Super. 1989) (refusing to recognize a public
policy, noting that several cases had examined various codes of ethics as potential public policy
sources and had determined that the various plaintiffs pointed to no sufficiently clear expression
of public policy). See also Weider v. Skala, 544 N.Y.S.2d 971, 972 (N.Y. App, Div. 1989?,
af4'd, 562 N.Y.S.2d 930 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (declining to recognize a public policy in
professional ethics codes, finding that New York law requires a constitutional provision or
statute).
147. Moskowitz, supra note 13, at 56-57.
148. Alfred G. Feliu, Discharge of ProfessionalEmployees: ProtectingAgainst Dismissal
for Acts Within a Professional Code of Ethics, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 165 (197980).
149. General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503 n.6 (Cal. 1994). For a
general discussion on ethical codes and public policy see Reynolds, supra note 23, at 567-68
nn.83-85 (citing Charles Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, §§ 2.2.3, 2.6, and 2.6.1 (1986));
Charles Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 62 MINN. L. REv. 619, 636-39 (1978).
150. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503. See also Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d
680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992). Note that once the in-house counsel-employee establishes such a
claim, he must next point to a specific statute or ethical rule that specifically permits the attorney
to depart from the usual requirement of confidentiality with respect to the client-eriployer.
General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 490.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol31/iss2/4

24

1995]

Lonker: DYNAMICS
General Dynamics v. Superior Court: One Giant Step Forward for In
GENERAL
V. SUPERIOR COURT
301

The Nordling,'5 ' Mourad,1s2 and Parker'53 courts did not specifically hold that ethical mandates constitute public policy.154
In
McGonagle,' the court found that ethical codes did not constitute public
policy.'56 Therefore, in recognizing a claim based on public policy found in
ethical codes, constitutional provisions, and statutory provisions, the court
gave in-house counsel in California the broadest range of protection afforded
any in-house counsel in this nation.
While the court took great strides in extending several different public
policy grounds on which in-house counsel could base wrongful termination
claims, they could have gone further. For example, the court could also
extend the notion of public policy to encompass judge-made law."5 7 The
common law is particularly relevant in ascertaining issues of public policy
not yet explicitly contained in a statute or constitutional provision.158 One
commentator, Professor Moskowitz, in an article on attorney codes of ethics
has endorsed the notion that public policy should not be restricted to statutory
formulation.5 9 By allowing the maximum number of avenues for in-house
counsel to protect their rights, we encourage attorneys to obey the law, and
in the process of protecting the lawyer, in acting ethically, the public welfare
is promoted.

151. Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).
152. Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Assoc., 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
153. Parker v. M&T Chem., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1989).
154. See discussion, supra part m.
155. McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
156. Id. at 884. But see Parker v. M & T Chem., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989) (finding that a public policy claim did lie in a state whistleblowers statute).
Note further that the Balla and Herbstercourts found clear expressions of public policy involved
but declined to allow in house counsel to assert such public policy claims. Balla v. Gambro,
584 N.E.2d 104, 107-08 (Ill. 1991); Herbster v. North American Co. for Life and Health Ins.,
501 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
157. See supra notes 98, 113. In California, judge-made law is not considered in making
a public policy determination. Gantt v. Sentry Inc., 824 P.2d 680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992). But see
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 ((N.J. 1980) ("The sources of public
policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial
decisions.").
158. Giesel, supra note 89, at 568. Professor Giesel noted several examples. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an employee discharged for refusing to
engage in sexual conduct with her supervisor stated a claim for wrongful discharge because her
discharge contravened public policy. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th
Cir. 1984). The court looked to "the shared moral values of the people of Arkansas and the
considerable clues to be found in the positive law," which included a criminal statute against
prostitution, to find public policy. Id. See also Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d 114,
116 (Or. 1984) (Employee claimed he was fired for refusing to sign a defamatory report about
a subordinate employee. The Oregon Supreme Court referred to sections of the Oregon
Constitution prohibiting defamation, then stated that the employee was discharged wrongly for
"fulfilling a societal obligation."); Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir.
1983) (employee claimed he was terminated for refusing to participate in a lobbying effort. The
court referred to case law protecting First Amendment freedoms to find a public policy).
159. Moskowitz, supra note 13, at 53.
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VI. CONFIDENTIALITY IN CALIFORNIA

In granting in-house counsel the common law right to sue for wrongful
termination, the California Supreme Court failed to take into consideration
California's already restrictive confidentiality laws. In General Dynamics,
the court expressly declined to adopt the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct or the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a predicate for
a retaliatory discharge suit.'" Instead, the court bound in-house counsel
in California to the ethical prescriptions embodied in the state's Rules of
Professional Conduct and certain provisions of the Business and Professions
Code. 161 These rules, which encompass confidentiality and the attorneyclient privilege, are far less comprehensive than the Model Rules or Model
Code and provide little or no protection to an attorney forced to reveal
information to prevent from being wrongfully terminated. The court then
found that "where the elements of a wrongful termination in violation of
fundamental public policy cannot, for reasons peculiar to the particular case,
be fully established without breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit
must be dismissed in the interest of preserving the privilege." 62
In so doing, the court strictly limited in-house counsel's chances of

successfully bringing a retaliatory discharge suit, perhaps making General
Dynamics a hollow victory for in-house counsel by actually prohibiting inhouse counsel from bringing suit. This is so because the rules pertaining to
confidentiality in California are far less inclusive than those under the Model
Code and Model Rules. Thus, even though the supreme court has held that
in-house counsel may reveal certain kinds of privileged information, realistically they are severely limited by the current state of the confidentiality laws
in California.
According to the California Business and Professions Code, an attorney
is prohibited from revealing client confidences in almost every conceivable
circumstance. 63 This contrasts with the Model Code of Professional

160. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 487, 503 n.6.
161. Id. Furthermore, in-house counsel can bring claims which non-attorney employees
could bring, subject to the strict confidentiality rules of California. Id. at 503.
162. Id. at 503-04. While the court also noted that trial court's can and should apply an
array of ad hoc measures to permit the attorney to make the necessary proof while protecting
the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 504, the discussion in this section is limited to the problems
with respect to the confidentiality rules in California. A discussion of the "ad hoc" measures
referred to by the court will be undertaken in the next section.
163. CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1994). This section simply states that it is
the duty of the attorney "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or
herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her clients." Id. This language can be interpreted such
that an attorney must keep secret: the client's intention to commit any crime; the client's
intention to commit a crime likely to result in death or bodily injury; the client's intention to
commit a criminal fraud likely to result in injury to the financial interest or property of another
party; the client's intention to commit a non-criminal fraud likely to result in injury to the financial interest or property of another party; the client's prior commission of a crime or fraud,
using the lawyer's services, resulting in injury to the financial interest or property of another
party; the client's prior or contemporaneous commission of perjury or other fraud on a tribunal;
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Conduct and Rules of Professional Conduct effective in other states which
allow disclosure of confidential information in certain circumstances. Thus,

attorneys in California are not afforded the same rights or opportunities to
disclose confidential information as their counterparts in other jurisdictions.

A. Imminent Death or SubstantialBodily Harm Exception
Rule 1.6 (b)(1) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provides that a lawyer may reveal confidential disclosures of his client "to

prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." In California,

section 956.5 of the Evidence Code provides substantially the same
language. 6 4 In light of this, the California Supreme Court found:
[m]any of the cases in which in-house counsel is faced with an ethical
dilemma will lie outside the scope of the statutory privilege. Matters
involving the commission of a crime or a fraud, or circumstances in which
the attorney reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent the
commission of a criminal act likely to result in death or substantial bodily

harm, are 6statutory and well-recognized exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege. 1

The court failed to realize however, that no such corresponding rule in
the Rules of Professional Conduct exists. A rule similar to Rule 1.6 (b)(1)
was proposed in California in 1992.166 This rule was never promulgated

and the client's contemporaneous misrepresentation or concealment of material fact amounting
to a criminal or fraudulent act by the client. 1993 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, 126 (Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 1993). Morgan and
Rotunda also note that the California Rules of Professional Conduct do not regulate client
confidences. See also id. at 127-32 for a state-by-state breakdown of confidentiality rules. But
see CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (West 1994) (providing a limited exception to the confidentiality
rule for disclosure of communications necessary to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm); CAL. EVID. CODE § 958 (West 1994) (permitting disclosure with respect to a breach in
the attorney-client relationship). However, this section has been interpreted very narrowly. As
will be discussed below, these exceptions create more problems in California than they solve.
164. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (West 1994).
165. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504. The court was referring to CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 956 with respect to "matters involving the commission of a crime or fraud." This section
deals specifically with cases in which the services of the attorney were obtained to commit the
fraud or crime. This is generally not the case with in-house counsel. Most often they are
employed to act as in-house counsel first, and then they are placed in an inappropriate situation.
In-house counsel are very rarely hired primarily to aid or enable an employer to commit a crime
or fraud.
166. Proposed Rule 3-100 would have read in relevant part:
Duty To Maintain Client Confidence and Secrets Inviolate.
(C) A member is not subject to discipline who reveals a confidence or secret:
(1) With the consent of the client; or
(2) To the extent the member reasonably believes necessary to prevent
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by the California Supreme Court. 67 Presumably, this was a message that
any such change would have to be made by the legislature. 168 There is,
therefore, a serious dilemma if a lawyer decides that it is reasonably
necessary to disclose such information in the corporate context and then uses
such information in a suit against his former client. If the attorney discloses
such information, he will be protected under Evidence Code section 956.5.
The attorney, however, is still bound to follow the professional rules of
conduct. Under those rules in California, the attorney has no such
protection. Rule 3-100 was expressly rejected by the supreme court.
Therefore, while an attorney may reveal corporate misconduct possibly
resulting in death or bodily injury, the employer, in turn, may report the
attorney for breach of professional ethics.' 69 In other words, the attorney
the commission of a criminal act that the member believes is
imminently likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.
RICHARD C. WYDICK & REx R. PERSCHBACHER, CALIFORNIA LEGAL ETHICS

201

(1992).

167. See Michael J. Hall, Court Rejects Lawvyer-Client PrivilegeShift, L.A. DAILY J., June
4, 1993, at 1. The ruling was issued in an unsigned order that said only, "request denied."
Request Re Rule 3-100, S029971. Id.
168. Id.
169. Rule 1-100 of the CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT provides in pertinent part:
(A) Purpose and Function. The following rules are intended to regulate professional
conduct of members of the State Bar through discipline. They have been adopted by
the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California and approved by the Supreme
Court of California pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 6076 and
6077 to protect the public and to promote respect and confidence in the legal
profession. These rules together with any standards adopted by the Board of
Governors pursuant to these rules shall be binding upon all members of the State Bar.
For a willful breach of any of these rules, the Board of Governors has the power to
discipline members as provided by law.
The prohibition of certain conduct in these rules is not exclusive. Members are also
bound by applicable law including the State Bar Act (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6000 et
seq.) and opinions of California courts. Although not binding, opinions of ethics
committees in California should be consulted by members for guidance on proper
professional conduct. Ethics opinions and rules and standards promulgated by other
jurisdictions and bar associations may also be considered. Id. Furthermore, Cal.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6103 provides:
A willful disobedience or violation of an order of the court requiring him to do or
forbear an act connected with or in the course of his profession, which he ought in
good faith to do or forbear, and any violation of the oath taken by him, or of his
duties as such attorney, constitute causes for disbarment or suspension.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6103 (Deering 1995).
Similarly, the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, Standard 2.6
provides in pertinent part:
Culpability of a member of a violation of any of the following provisions of the
Business and Professions Code shall result in disbarment or suspension depending on
the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the
purposes of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3:
(a) Sections 6067 and 6068;
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discloses such information at the risk of losing his or her license to practice

law. 70 If in-house counsel in California disclosed such information, then

they may succeed against their former client for wrongful termination, but
they may be sanctioned or lose their license to practice law. In essence, inhouse counsel are in the same or worse position than before General
Dynamics. Counsel may disclose certain confidences under the Evidence
Code, but instead of losing a job, they could now lose the profession that
they spent years of time, money, and effort acquiring. Faced with these
choices, silence may indeed be the better part of valor. 171
An opinion by the Legal Ethics and Unlawful Practices Committee of the
San Diego County Bar Association provides some insight into the extreme
views taken by some in California, with respect to confidentiality issues."T
In this opinion, the committee posed a hypothetical where a client displayed

a handgun and disclosed to his attorney that he was going to kill his codefendant, who had agreed to cooperate with the prosecution.7 "

An

attorney believed that his client intended to seriously injure or kill the informant.

74

The question presented was whether it was permissible for the

attorney to disclose his client's intentions, or otherwise warn the authorities
of the impending danger."' 5

The committee undertook a detailed analysis, discussing ABA Model

(b) Sections 6103 through 6105....
Standard 2.6
(Deering 1988).
Thus, if an in-house counsel violates Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) by disclosing a client's
secrets or confidences he is subject to suspension or disbarment. For an excellent analysis of
the interplay of these rules see In the Matter of Judson D. Lilley, A Member of the State Bar,
1991 WL 70703 (Cal. Bar Ct.).
170. See Gerald F. Uelman & Robert Peterson, Attorney-Client Dilemma, L.A. DAILY J.,
Feb. 3, 1994, at 6. (the duty of confidentiality is not defined by the attorney-client evidentiary
privilege, but transcends it). See also Hall, supra note 167 (Rules of Professional Conduct, the
violation of which can be punished by sanctions, including disbarment, are proposed by the State
STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY SANCTIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT.

Bar).

171. It is unclear what the effect of a court order to reveal confidential information would
have on the foregoing analysis. Perhaps a court would employ the "ad hoe" measures
mentioned by the GeneralDynamics court such as sealing and protective orders and in camera
proceedings. General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal. 1994). However,
as will be discussed in section VI, the purpose of a court order in this case would be to reveal
information to protect the public. The ad hoc measures discussed by the court are used to
ensure confidential information is not revealed to the public. Thus, the problem becomes a
vicious circle of how to accommodate the conflicting policy concerns of protecting the public
and protecting the attorney-client relationship. Furthermore, while a court may order the
revelation of confidential information, it may not arbitrarily decide that a lawyer should not be
forced to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Therefore, the lawyer is between a
rock and a hard place.
172. San Diego County Bar Association Ethical Opinion, at 3, 1990 - April 1991.
173. Id. at 1.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Rule 1.6, proposed rule 3-100, the related psychotherapist-patient privilege, 76 and California case law, and determined that:
Despite the obvious moral dilemma presented to the attorney in the
foregoing scenario, California law (including section 6068(e) of the
Business and Professions Code) forbids the attorney from disclosing any
information obtained in confidence from the client. No implied common
law duties or rules of professional conduct promulgated in other jurisdictions apply to allow even a limited disclosure."V

If the bar association is unwilling to recognize a limited exception in
circumstances in which extreme violence is a real possibility, then it is not
difficult to predict how they would view disclosing less extreme or damaging
information in the corporate setting.
B. Controversy Between a Lawyer and Client
The conflict above deals strictly with the revelation of confidences with
regard to death or serious bodily injury. Corporate counsel will likely
encounter a far greater variety of circumstances in which it may become
necessary to reveal confidential information. In those instances, a rule
similar to Rule 1.6(b)(2) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
isnecessary.
Rule 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure of confidential information that the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary "to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to
establish a claim or defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the lawyer was involved, or to respond
to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client."'78 A rule similar to this must be enacted by the State Bar in
176. This exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege was enunciated in Tarasoff v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), and codified in CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024.
The exception provides that where a psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the
patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person
or property of another, and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the
threat and danger, the psychotherapist may reveal such information.
177. San Diego County Bar Association Ethical Opinion 1990, at 1. Note that this opinion
is advisory only. It is not binding on the State Bar, the Board of Governors, its agents or
employees. See supra note 169, at 1.
178. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2). Rule 1.6(b)(2)
provides:

(b) A lawyer may reveal such (confidential) information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client.
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California if in-house counsel are to truly have the opportunity to exercise
their rights, as granted them by the California Supreme Court, in a suit
against their employer for wrongful termination. Furthermore, the language,
"to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy

between the lawyer and the client" must be interpreted broadly to allow the
in-house counsel to go forward with her lawsuit. Wrongful termination
certainly involves a "controversy" between the employer and the employee.

A broad interpretation will give the employee in-house counsel a forum to
resolve this controversy.
For example, under a broad interpretation of Rule 1.6(b)(2), 17 9 the in80
house counsel in Balla, Herbster, Parker, Willy, Mourad, and Nordling"

would be permitted to disclose confidential information reasonably necessary
to establish their claim or defense in the controversy between them and their

employer.' 8 ' By doing so, the in-house counsel would be vindicating their
rights not to be wrongfully terminated and vindicating important public
policies. These policies include disclosing adulterated medical products into
the market,"8 encouraging compliance with federal laws," s discouraging

See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) which provides:
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
... (4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
179. For example, construing this rule broadly, any time an in-house counsel is terminated
for refusing to breach their ethical duties or reporting conduct that could cause bodily injury or
harm, this would constitute a "controversy" within the meaning of Rule 1.6(b)(2). Similarly,
such actions on the part of the in-house counsel would also constitute responding to allegations
concerning the lawyer's representation of that client, within the meaning of Rule 1.6(b)(2).
Thus a broad interpretation of Rule 1.6(b)(2) will not afford attorneys the opportunity to
effectively resolve controversies arising from wrongful terminations.
180. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
181. A recent opinion of the Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Committee ("the Committee")
adopted a broad interpretation of an Oregon ethical rule analogous to Rule 1.6(b)(2). The
Committee discussed the case of the general manager of a company and a lawyer, who
occasionally provided legal services to the company. While pursuing a product patent for the
company, he learned that the product had been invented by the company's customer and not the
company. To acquire a patent, the lawyer was required to make an oath on behalf of the
company as applicant, naming them the "original and first inventor." The lawyer refused to
make that representation and was fired as a result. If the lawyer made such a representation he
could have been criminally prosecuted. The lawyer intended to pursue a wrongful discharge
action in which it may have been necessary to disclose confidential information. 1994 WL
49747 (Or. St. B. Ass'n) at *1. The Committee first found that the information learned was
either a secret or confidence of the client. Id. at 2. The Committee then found that under Or.
Rule Prof. Conduct DR 4-101(c)(4), which mirrors the language of Role 1.6(b)(2), disclosure
was allowed to establish a wrongful discharge claim. Id. at 2. Such a result would fit perfectly
into the framework already established by GeneralDynamics. In fact, the Committee noted that
Oregon does not provide in-house counsel with the right to sue for wrongful termination,
although they noted that for purposes of discussion only, the Committee assume that such a
claim can be stated. Id. Fitzpatrick & Kim, supra note 129, at 340-41. See also CAL. RULES
PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1-100 ("Ethics opinions and rules and standards promulgated by other
jurisdictions and bar associations may also be considered.").
182. Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991).
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the destruction of documents and obstruction of justice," 4 preventing fraud
by refusing to violate a court order,"as and preventing the invasion of
privacy of citizens.' 86 All of the above provide clear examples of public
policy that the in-house attorneys were attempting to advance., A broad
interpretation of a rule similar to Rule 1.6(b)(2) would provide the vehicle
for advancing those public policy concerns and assisting in-house counsel in
vindicating their rights.' 88 When in-house counsel are terminated for
refusing to violate their ethical mandates or reporting corporate conduct that
could endanger the public welfare, a sufficient controversy exists as to
whether the in-house counsel must be able to defend themselves against
corporate overreaching.
Even without a rule similar to Rule 1.6(b)(2) in California, there is still
an argument to provide the protection afforded by that rule. The California
State Bar Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct has found
that while the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility has no direct effect
on lawyers practicing in California, these rules may be looked to as collateral
sources-particularly when no direct authority on an ethical issue exists. The
Code can also be used as persuasive authority if it is not in conflict with the
public policy of California.'89 Based on General Dynamics, the public
policy of California is to provide in-house counsel with a forum to protect
their right not to be wrongfully terminated.1 As there is no authority in
California to permit disclosure of confidential information necessary to bring
a wrongful termination suit, California courts should look to Rule 1.6(b)(2)
as persuasive authority and allow necessary reasonable disclosures in order
to effectuate the policies enunciated in GeneralDynamics.
Furthermore, there are numerous other sources that allow or advocate
183. Willy v. Coastal Corporation, 647 F.Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
184. Herbster v. North American Co. for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (I11.App.
Ct. 1986).
185. Parker v. M & T Chem., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
186. Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).

187. See also CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE § 6103 (West 1994) (providing suspension for
wilful disobedience of a court order); CAL. RULE PROF. CONDUCT, Rule 5-220 (prohibiting
attorney from suppressing evidence that the lawyer has a legal obligation to produce); CAL.
RULE PROF. CONDUCT, Rule 3-210 (member shall not advise the violation of any law, rule, or
ruling of a tribunal unless member has a good faith belief the ruling is invalid).
188. See also Gillers, supra note 125, at 14-17. Professor Gillers advocates a broad
interpretation of Rule 1.6(b)(2). Id.
189. 1983 WL 31672 (Cal. St. B. Comm. Prof. Resp.) (citing People v. Ballard, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 81 (Ct. App. 1980)); Altschul v. Sayble, 147 Cal. Rptr. 716 (Ct. App. 1978).
190. The court enunciated this policy as follows:
On balance, these considerations favor allowing a tort claim for discharges for
reasons that contravene an attorney's mandatory ethical obligations or for which a
non-attorney employee could maintain such a claim and a statute or ethical code or
provision permits the attorney to depart from the usual rule that client matters remain
confidential.
General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994).
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the position that confidentiality rules should be relaxed with respect to

lawyer-client disputes.' 9'

These sources support the position that by

allowing in-house counsel to disclose confidential information in a reasonable

manner, the attorney can safeguard important mandates of public policy and,
at the same time, vindicate their rights not to be wrongfully terminated. It

has further been noted that client confidences are always at risk when
lawyers and clients part ways. For example,
[i]f the lawyer was asked to act illegally or was terminated for questioning
illegal acts, then the communication surrounding such acts should not be
entitled to protection because they would not have been learned in a
legitimate client-lawyer relationship. 92 Further, since the policy of the
[attorney-client] privilege is that of promoting the administration ofjustice,
it would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it to the client who
seeks advice to aid him in carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme."9

Thus, the attorney-client relationship is an integral part of the profession and
steps should be taken to ensure that confidences learned during the course of

representation remain confidential. This is not an ironclad rule, however, and
circumstances do exist where, in the interests of justice, revelation of
confidential information is appropriate.
C. Model Statute to Effectuate the

General Dynamics' Policy Goals
In order to give full effect to the GeneralDynamics decision, the state

bar must promulgate and the supreme court must approve rules similar to
Model Rules 1.6(b)(1), 1.6(b)(2) and proposed rule 3-100. Many other
jurisdictions, including several with large populations such as California,

191. See Parker v. M & T Chem., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 222 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989) interpreting A.B.A./B.N.A. Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, 55:701 (as
permitting disclosure of otherwise confidential information which an attorney reasonably believes
necessary to support a claim against a client); Restatement Third, The Law Governing Layers
(Tentative draft #2) (1989) recommending exceptions to the privilege for "Client Crimes and
Fraud," § 132 at 238 and for "Lawyer Self-Protection," § 133 at 252. But cf. Theodore I.
Koskoff, The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, Commission on ProfessionalResponsibility
(Revised Draft, May 1982), preface (rejecting the concept that lawyer's have a general duty to
do good for society that often overrides their specific duty to serve their clients. Serving clients
is the lawyer's basic reason for being a lawyer, and the exceptions to the fundamental rule of
absolute loyalty to clients must be minimal, and must be strictly construed). Note, however,
that even under this strict standard, the lawyer is permitted to reveal confidences to the extent
necessary to defend the lawyer against charges of criminal, civil, or professional misconduct
asserted by the client, or against formally instituted charges of such conduct in which the client
is implicated. THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (The Roscoe Pound-American
Trial Lawyer's Foundation, Commission on Professional Responsibility, Revised Draft, 1982),
reprintedin Morgan & Rotunda, supra note 163, at 238-40.
192. Gillers, supra note 125, at 19.
193. Abramson, supra note 7, at 277 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 95, at 229 (3d ed. 1984)).
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have adopted similar rules and some have gone even further, 4 Furthermore, in these states, in-house counsel do not have the common law right to
sue for wrongful termination that in-house counsel have in California.'95
For example, in New Jersey, a lawyer must reveal information to the proper
authorities to prevent the client from committing an illegal "or fraudulent act
that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of
another." 9 6

New Jersey's statute represents one of the broadest statutes in the nation
regarding an attorney's right to reveal confidential information where the
lawyer is used to further a client's illegal or unethical goals, or similarly, put
in a position where they are forced to act either illegally or unethically or be
fired. A statute identical to this New Jersey statute would give in-house
counsel in California the full opportunity to exercise their rights as defined
in General Dynamics. This statute addresses almost any circumstance with
which an in-house counsel could be faced. If in-house counsel were
terminated for internally reporting their client's release of toxic fumes in the
air, they would be protected by this statute because this release could clearly
result in death or bodily harm. If in-house counsel refused to shred
discovery documents or copy files under a protective court order and was
terminated, they would be protected because this would be perpetrating a

194. See, e.g. MD. RULES PROF. CONDUCT Rules 1.6, 3.3, & 4.1; NEv. RULES PROF.
CONDUCT Rules 156, 172, & 181; PA. RULES PROF. CONDUCT Rules 1.6, 3.3, & 4.1; OHIO
RULES PROF. CONDUCT Rules DR 4-101 & DR 7-102; TEx. RULES PROF. CONDUCT Rules
1.05, 3.03, & 4.01; and FLA. RULES PROF. CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6(b)(1).
195. After General Dynamics, California is the only state to grant in-house counsel a
common law right to sue for wrongful termination.
196. N.J. RULES PROF. CONDUCTRule 1.6 (West 1994) (emphasis added). This rule reads
in pertinent part:
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such (confidential) information to the proper authorities, as
soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the
client
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal, or fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interests or property
of another;
(2) from committing a criminal, illegal, or fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal.
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal, illegal, or
fraudulent act in furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been
used;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to
a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint against the
lawyer based upon the conduct in which the client was involved; or
(3) to comply with other law.
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fraud upon a tribunal.
Further, a majority of work done by in-house counsel relates to financial
matters. This includes drafting contracts, reviewing mergers and takeovers,
negotiating with cities, municipalities, and state and federal governments,
purchasing and selling real property, banking and finance issues, purchasing
and selling stock, tax and bond issues, and innumerable other financial
dealings. Because in-house counsel deal with financial matters on a daily
basis, there is a strong possibility that they will encounter situations where
they are forced to act unethically or illegally and cause financial injury to
person or property, or perpetrate a fraud. This statute addresses financial
harm to person and property. The language in the New Jersey statute
directly tracks the policy considerations set forth in General Dynamics.
Therefore, if California enacted a statute identical to that of New Jersey, inhouse counsel would be afforded every protection envisioned by the supreme
court in General Dynamics.
VII. MEASURES TO AVOID DIscLOsuRE
OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

As demonstrated above, the restrictive confidentiality rules in California
may act to place in-house counsel in the same or possibly worse situation
than before General Dynamics. In recognition of the anticipated problems
regarding disclosure of client confidences, the California Supreme Court did
propose certain "ad hoc measures" that trial courts can take to allow in-house
counsel to go forward with their suits."9 Some of these ad hoc measures
include: Using sealing and protective orders, limiting admissibility of
evidence, restricting the use of testimony in successive proceedings, and,
where appropriate, in camera proceedings. These are but a few of the
measures that might be explored by the trial courts as circumstances
warrant.' 98 While these measures may be effective by inducing some inhouse counsel to consider both the best interests of their employer and the
best interests of the public welfare, a better solution is to avoid court
altogether. This can be done in two ways: internal procedures established
by the corporation itself, and private agreements between the employer and
employee that require neutral arbitration of any disputes arising out of the
employment relationship.

197. General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal. 1994).
198. Id. See also Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043, 1045 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983). To prevent
identification of the company and the possible disclosure of confidential information concerning
its affairs, the district court granted the defendant corporation's motion to seal the record,
require the suit to be prosecuted without revealing the name of either the lawyer or the
corporation, and enjoin Doe and his co-counsel from pursuing any actions arising out of the facts
on which his suits were based, communicating with other persons to induce them to bring a
similar action, and disclosing or using any information Doe gained during his employment with
the corporation. The appellate court affirmed this aspect of the district court's ruling. Id. at
1050-51.
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A. InternalDispute Mechanisms
One example of an internal dispute procedure comes from a preliminary
draft of the Uniform Employment Termination Act.'
The Act provides
arbitration as a remedy to aggrieved in-house counsel followed by court
review. °° The Act limits this court review to procedural review with
substantive review only for substantial errors of law. 20' Arbitration of
conflicts has the effect of protecting the confidentiality of the proceedings.0
Another proposal has been to set up an Ethics Resolution Committee
("ERC"). 0 3 This committee would be composed of other company
lawyers not involved in the present conflict.'
An ERC would review
internally complaints made by in-house counsel. The ERC would work much
the same as a jury, judge, or arbitrator; namely, as a fact finder. The facts,
however, would not be disseminated to the public. The ERC would analyze
the situation and determine whether the in-house counsel has a valid wrongful
termination claim. This proposal does have its problems, however. If an inhouse counsel is not satisfied with the decision of the committee he is entitled
to bring a wrongful termination claim. If the lawyer does so, he is still in
the position of having to reveal confidential information. Therefore, this
proposal is somewhat circular and only temporarily solves the major
stumbling block in disputes between in-house counsel and their employers;
confidentiality. Ultimately, an in-house counsel will seek full vindication of
his rights. If an ERC determines that the in-house counsel does not have a
valid claim, the in-house counsel will almost certainly seek redress in the
courts. Thus, the problem comes full circle because the in-house counsel
may be forced to reveal client confidences in order to prove a claim.
There is much scholarly comment on internal investigations. 05 Many
of the articles however, do not directly address suits by in-house counsel
against their employer. They focus instead on general disputes brought to
the attention of a corporation by certain regulatory bodies or non-attorney
199. See Giesel, supra note 89, at 592 (citing Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 49,559, 60,455 (Dec.
31, 1990 Draft)).
200. Id. at 593-94.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Gillers, supra note 125, at 25.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Robert S. Bennett et. al., The Role of Internal Investigations in Defending
Against Charges of CorporateMisconduct, in How TO HANDLE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AND
ESTABLISH SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS at 31 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 763, 1992); Charles S. Mishkind, Alternative Dispute Resolution of
Employment Disputes: A Pro-Active Alternative to the Annorplate/Litigation Approach to
Employment Disputes, in EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 1989: A DEFENSE AND PLAINTIFFS
PERSPECTIVE at 341 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 372, 1989);
Greg Gerard Guidry & Gerald J. Huffman, Jr., Legal and PracticalAspects of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Non-Union Companies, 6 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. LAW. 1 (1990).
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corporate employees. However, certain problems addressed in these articles
can be applied to the in-house counsel setting. For example, there are
problems with respect to confidentiality in internal proceedings that are
equally applicable in the in-house counsel setting.
One commentator has noted that maintaining the confidentiality of an
internal corporate investigation is critical, yet sometimes proves difficult. 26
By undertaking an internal investigation, the corporation takes some risk that
the investigative work product will be disclosed to the government, a current
or prospective litigation adversary, or the public.2

7

Thus, although

internal investigations and internal dispute mechanisms may seem attractive
at first, the problems that may arise regarding disclosure of confidential
information require some other arrangement between in-house counsel and
their employer.
B. PrivateAgreements
Perhaps the best solution to the problem of confidentiality is to have the
employer insert into the employment agreement with the in-house counsel,
a requirement that all disputes arising out of the employment be settled by
an outside neutral arbitrator. The agreement should contain a separate clause
pertaining solely to confidentiality and explicitly set forth guidelines to keep
all information confidential.
There are many advantages to this type of private agreement. An
employer can avoid the costs of litigation, including attorneys' fees and the
possibility of large jury verdicts, as well as the loss of productivity and
disruption that lawsuits impose. Further, if employees feel they have had an
adequate opportunity to be heard, they may not sue.208 Employees may
also wish to avoid the time and expense involved in a lengthy trial. 2 9
Finally, private arbitration agreements, entered into at arms-length by both
parties have generally been upheld.21 0 Therefore, a private agreement
mandating strict confidentiality could serve to alleviate some of the problems
inherent in internal dispute mechanisms.
The position of commentators who advocate internal dispute resolutions
or private agreements to arbitrate mandating confidentiality may, in certain
circumstances, be squarely at odds with the spirit of the GeneralDynamics
206. See Edward J.Yodowitz & Robert L. Meyers, A StructuralApproach to Conducting
Internal Corporate Investigations and Maintaining Confidentiality, in SECURITIES LITIGATION

1993:

CURRENT STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPMENTS

at 125 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course

Handbook Series No. 479, 1993).
207. Id. Furthermore, "the investigation might actually build a case against the corporation.
In addition, the discovery of additional wrongdoing might require the corporation to disclose
information of such wrongdoing, pursuant to, for example, the federal securities laws." Id.
208. See Moskowitz, supra note 13, at 66-67.

209. Id. at 68.
210. See, e.g., Shearson / American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Volt
Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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decision. For example, the court found that the doctrinal foundation of the
public policy tort claim is not so much the plaintiff's continued interest in
employment as the preservation of the public interest as it is expressed in the
constitution and statutory law."' If the in-house counsel is terminated for
internally reporting information that may cause injury to the general public,
the case would be privately arbitrated. Because the arbitration is confidential
none of the information concerning the harm would be made public.
Therefore, the only interest vindicated is that of the in-house counsel
personally. Contradictions and inconsistencies such as this must be squared
with the policies underlying wrongful termination suits in order to clearly
justify private, confidential, internal or external dispute mechanisms.
CONCLUSION

It is clearly in the public interest for in-house counsel to have a right to
sue for wrongful termination. In the end, society as a whole will benefit if
in-house counsel may reveal improper corporate conduct. In order to do so,
however, counsel must have an incentive; the ability to obtain just compensation from an employer who wrongfully terminates counsel for advancing
public policy.
The California Supreme Court took a laudable step in granting in-house
counsel such a right to sue for wrongful termination. General Dynamics,
however, is only the first step. In order for GeneralDynamics to have any
effect at all, the state legislature and the state supreme court must reexamine
the professional rules of conduct as they relate to confidentiality. These rules
must be expanded so that in-house counsel may exercise the rights granted
them under GeneralDynamics. The rules should be expanded to reflect the
laws of other jurisdictions discussed previously. The California Supreme
Court has already recognized more than any other jurisdiction, that in-house
counsel require special protection. They now must give in-house counsel the
tools necessary to reap the benefits of such protection.
In-house counsel must be given the statutory protection to reveal
otherwise confidential information, if such information will protect them
from being wrongfully discharged, and also protect some greater public
good. Further, all possible steps should be taken to make sure a corporation
suffers minimal damage from any disclosure that may occur. This can be
done by instituting private dispute mechanisms from within the corporation.
If this is not done, then the GeneralDynamics case will stand for nothing
more than a realization that in-house counsel do indeed need protection. This

211. General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 497 (Cal. 1994).
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realization however, cannot be given effect unless changes in the professional
rules are made.

Elliot M. Lonker'

* Thanks to Professor Thomas Barton for his helpful suggestions and comments, Arthur
Wellman for his invaluable cite checking assistance, Mark Featherman and the entire Editorial
Board, and to Deborah Ellsworth for her editorial assistance and patience.
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